



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STAFF NOTES:

Chinese Affairs

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CHINESE AFFAIRS

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China, Korea, and the UN

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Peking and Washington are on opposite sides of the Korea issue again this year at the United Nations, but there are indications that the Chinese are persuaded that they can convince the North Koreans of their loyalty without becoming involved in a bitter confrontation with the US.

Concern over the effect a confrontation in the UN might have on President Ford's planned visit to China later this year, as well as Peking's interest in encouraging a reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula, probably accounts for Chinese sensitivities on this score. Nevertheless, Peking will provide strong support for North Korea's case in the UN in order to protect its equities in Pyongyang.

Chinese press coverage of South Korea's unsuccessful application for admission to the UN set the tone for Peking's role in the UN debate on Korea later this fall. Chinese press accounts relied exclusively--until after the August 6 vote on Seoul's application--on replays of North Korean propaganda, and Pyongyang's most vitriolic language was excised.

The Chinese also ignored Pyongyang's claim that South Korea is a "puppet regime" that does not represent the South Korean people and North Korean assertions that Seoul could not survive without US military protection. Moreover, Pyongyang's demand that the US immediately withdraw its troops and weapons from the South was excised from Chinese accounts.

Peking media waited until the US vetoed North and South Vietnam's applications for admission to the UN before commenting directly on the Korea

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question. On August 11, referring to the US vetoes as "unreasonable," NCNA summarized UN Ambassador Huang Hua's comments on US attempts to link the "completely irrelevant" South Korean application with those of the two Vietnams.

According to the NCNA account, Huang said that China "cannot but express regret" at US attempts to make a "package deal" and suggested that the US, as a result, would "only land itself in greater isolation." Huang's sorrowful rather than angry criticism of US support for South Korea was considerably less harsh than the language he employed last year during UN debate on the Korea issue.

The Chinese have also displayed a degree of selectivity in their support for the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution that was announced last week. On August 12, NCNA ran a summarized version of a North Korean statement on the resolution. Peking's summary deleted most of Pyongyang's arguments for removing US troops from the South and for replacing the armistice commission with a peace treaty between the "real parties," a reference to North Korea and the US. The deletions point up Peking's interest in softening criticism of the US and, probably, in retaining some form of armistice guarantees.

In fact, the possibility of a lapse in the armistice arrangements has concerned the Chinese for some time.

Chinese media have also softened Pyongyang's harsh criticism of the pro-Seoul resolution introduced last month by the US and others.

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As they have for some time, the Chinese are walking a narrow path between their strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula and their desire to maintain the warmest possible ties with Pyongyang. From Peking's viewpoint, there is undoubtedly some advantage to a continuation, at least for the time being, of a divided Korea and a strong US presence in the South. Chinese leaders are probably persuaded that a dissolution of the UN Command that neglects provisions for an alternative peace-keeping mechanism could disrupt the status quo and lead to a scramble for influence in Korea.

If early estimates of the outcome on the UN Korea vote this year are correct, both resolutions will be approved. Neither, however, is likely to be implemented soon. Peking almost certainly will be pleased with that development, since it would probably result in no major changes in the Korean situation.

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The Reappearance of Lo Jui-ching
Christopher J. Szymanski (x20616)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The attendance of Lo Jui-ching, formerly PLA chief of staff, vice premier, and high party official, at the Army Day celebrations in Peking on July 31 is the most startling reappearance of a Cultural Revolution purge victim since that of Teng Hsiao-ping in the spring of 1973. Purged in late 1965, Lo reportedly tried to commit suicide following Red Guard harassment and heavy press criticism that linked him with the disgraced Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

The story behind Lo's purge has never fully emerged, but the likeliest explanation is that his emphasis on defense preparedness and professionalism in the army came into conflict with the Mao - Lin Piao emphasis on guerrilla warfare and political involvement. His reappearance would thus indicate a further step in the PLA's disengagement from domestic politics, a step that was instituted after Lin's abortive coup attempt in 1971.

Lo's current state of health is unknown, but since he is about 70 years old his future role may prove more symbolic than substantive. On the other hand, past ceremonial appearances of those purged during the Cultural Revolution have often preceded their reappointment to major positions, and Lo may be slotted for a substantive job high in the military hierarchy.

Lo in 1965: The escalation of the Vietnam war in 1965 confronted Peking with strategic problems: how to assist Hanoi; whether China might be invaded; how China should defend itself. Two answers surfaced publicly--one by Lo, the other by Lin Piao.

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In an article in *Red Flag* in May 1965 commemorating the defeat of Germany in World War II, Lo advocated primary reliance on professional military methods:

- preparations against the eventuality that "imperialism may suddenly impose a war on us" should include planning not only for small- and medium-scale warfare but also for large-scale warfare, including nuclear weapons;
- China should adopt a strategy of "active defense," concentrating superior forces to destroy the "enemy's effectives";
- victory requires close integration of the armed forces and the civilian population, coordination on the battlefield, and close cooperation among the different armed services, the ground forces being primary.

Lo apparently further maintained that China should:

- prepare to resist invasion, even if this would divert the PLA from domestic political activities;
- rely more heavily on regular ground forces, particularly the infantry rather than local militia units;
- prepare defense positions and rapidly improve air defenses in the south against a possible US air strike;
- greatly increase allocation of resources to the defense sector.

Lo's military views, although apparently widely accepted within the Chinese military, were in direct

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opposition to Mao's and Lin's advocacy of a politically active PLA and primary reliance on a guerrilla defense strategy. In a September 1965 article, "Long Live the People's War," which attracted wide attention, Lin argued that, as had been the case in the Chinese revolution, the Third World "countryside" would surround and overcome the developed "cities." Lin's principal point was that in Vietnam, China, and the Third World countries Peking and its allies should rely mainly on guerrilla warfare rather than attempt to engage in modern technological warfare. To meet the enemy on his own terms was foolish, he argued.

Lo had also castigated "US imperialism," but his foreign policy stance seems to have accorded with the general position of the central leadership at the time. In retrospect, it appears unlikely that his position centered on an active anti-American stand or that he had pro-Soviet leanings. Rather, his purge in late 1965 was probably the result of major differences in military doctrine with the Mao-Lin group.

Lo in 1975. Lo's advocacy in 1965 of heavier defense allocations took place at a time when Peking perceived a heightened military threat from the US. He may well hold different views today, when that danger is no longer perceived, and when stepped-up defense efforts might conflict with the present emphasis on developing China into a "modern, industrialized socialist state" by the end of the century. Chou En-lai proclaimed this goal at the Fourth National People's Congress last January.

In other ways, Lo's 1965 views conform to several aspects of Peking's current policy. His argument that the PLA should give primacy to its purely military functions accords with Peking's steady efforts since the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 to get the armed forces out of civilian political

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and economic activity. Further, his stress on military professionalism--carrying the implication that technical training is important and that politicization should not be overstressed--parallels the current "rational" emphasis in Chinese economic planning.

In sum, Lo's rehabilitation may be another step in the gradual strengthening of the "moderates" at the expense of the "leftists" which has occurred since Lin's fall.

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Army Day in the Provinces

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Army Day turnouts were marked by the unexpected absence of leading military district (MD) personnel. While eight of the eleven military region commanders publicly appeared in their provinces, only two military district-level commanders, from Kwangtung District and Peking Garrison, appeared in place. The appearance of some military district personnel outside their home provinces and the recent appointment of a new MD commander and political commissar in Chekiang suggest that a shift in military personnel at the district level may be under way.

All of the transferred personnel also held party positions in their home provinces--Yang Ta-i, who appeared in Liaoning, was formerly MD commander and party secretary in Hunan, while Ho Kuang-yu, the new MD commander in Kansu, was a deputy party secretary and MD commander in Kweichow. Several other lower level MD personnel who previously held party posts were among the other military men transferred.

The major shift, however, was the transfer of Wang Chia-tao to Liaoning where he appeared sixteenth on the turnout list. Wang, who has not appeared in Heilungkiang since 1974, lost his posts as first party secretary and MD commander in the transfer.

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Turnouts this year were rather large, with most provinces holding simultaneous rallies in several locations. Provincial party leaders were conspicuously present, and in most cases the leading party representative delivered the keynote address.

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The party's primacy was also reflected in the holiday propaganda. Among the themes stressed were the leading role of the party, the importance of studying Mao's instruction on theory, unity, and stability, and the need to increase production. [redacted]

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ARMY DAY TURNOUTS IN THE PROVINCES

<u>Province</u>	<u>Turnout Led By</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Anhwei	Wang Kuang-yu, party secretary	
Chekiang	"responsible persons"	Chang Wen-pi named new MD commander July 22
Fukien	Pi-Ting-chun Fuchou MR commander Liao Chih-kao, 1st secretary	
Heilungkiang	Chang Lin-chih, party secretary	Wang Chia-tao, 1st secretary, appears in Liaoning
Honan	Liu Chien-hsun, 1st secretary Yang Chung-yi, deputy MD commander	extensive party turnout
Hopeh	Kuo Chih, party standing committee	
Hunan	Chang Ping Hua, 2nd secretay Wang Yu-hua, deputy MD commander	
Hupeh	Yang Te-chih, Wuhan MR commander Chao Hsin-chu, 1st secretary	Chao delivers the keynote address
Inner Mongolia	"responsible persons"	
Kansu	"responsible persons"	Hsien Heng-kan, 1st secretary, appears on August 7, with new MD commander at congress of demobilized servicemen; Han Hsien-chu MR commander appears on August 10

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Turnout Led By</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Kiangsi	Pai Tung-tsai, 1st secretary	She Chi-te, party secretary and long time Fuchou MR man appears in Fukien
Kiangsu	"responsible persons"	Ting Sheng, Nanking MR commander, does not appear
Kirin	"responsible persons"	
Kwangsi	"responsible persons"	Wei Kuo-ching, 1st secretary, appears in Canton in his role as MR 1st political commissar
Kwangtung	Hsu Shih-yu Canton MR commander Wei Kuo-ching 1st political commissar Chao Tsu-yang 1st secretary	Chang Ching Yao MD commander appears
25X1 Kweichow		
Liaoning	Li Te-sheng, MR commander Tseng Shao-shan, deputy MR commander	Mao Yuan Hsin appears in fourth place; Wang Chia-tao and Yang Ta-i, Hunan MD commander appear
25X1 Ningsia		
Shanghai	Wang Hung-wen Ma Tien-shui, party secretary	Wang identified with Vice Chairman Military Affairs Commission but title dropped in rebroadcasts
25X1 Shansi		
Shantung	Pai Ju-ping, 1st secretary Tseng Ssu-yu, MR commander	

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Turnout Led By</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Shensi	Ma Hsi-sheng, RC vice chairman Wu Heng-sheng, deputy MD commander	
Sinkiang	Yang Yung MR commander Tsao Ssu-ming, 1st polit- ical commissar	
Szechuan	Liu Hsing-yuan 1st secretary Chin Chi-wei MR commander	
Tibet	Tien Pao, party secretary	Jen Jung, 1st sec- retary, does not appear
Tsinghai	Li Ping, secretary Sining MPC	
Yunnan		

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Signs of Indecision

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Although Peking seems to be dealing forcefully and effectively with major issues such as the military and the economy, there appears to be some confusion or hesitation over how to handle a few lesser issues.

On Army Day, NCNA in an English-language broadcast identified party leader Wang Hung-wen as a vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee, an unusual position for a civilian. Teng Hsiao-ping, the only other civilian known to be a vice chairman of the committee, has never been publicly identified as such. Even more unusual, subsequent broadcasts and publications failed to mention Wang's military title.

What prompted Peking to switch is a mystery. The outside world learned of Wang's new title through the initial release, and rumors of his new position had circulated within China for some time.

Last March, Peking announced the conclusion of preparatory meetings for the national congresses of China's mass organizations--the Women's Federation, Trade Union, and Youth League. The announcement indicated that the congresses themselves would be held after "due preparations," and some provinces began to select delegates. This process came to a sudden halt, however, and no further preparations seem to be under way.

The congresses could have been pushed to the back burner by the meeting this summer of party and military leaders in Peking, but that meeting is now over. Factionalism in the provinces may also be contributing to the delay, as well as the major economic push throughout the country. Both factionalism and the emphasis on the economy, however,

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were facts of life when the preparatory meetings were held last winter. It is now an open question whether preparations for the congresses can be completed this year.

A third development is Peking's apparent back-pedaling on conversion to the Pinyin system, China's own method for Romanizing Chinese names. A State Council message announcing that China would convert to the Pinyin system on September 1 was prepared for release last May. Within hours, however, NCNA was told to delay indefinitely the release of the message. It is clear that the Chinese had second thoughts about adopting the Pinyin system.

To date, Chinese officials have been unable to confirm that the system would go into effect on September 1. In fact, several officials have been vague about whether the system will ever be adopted.

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Military Notes

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The Army Day turnout in Peking indicates that the PLA has become increasingly conscious of the technical and doctrinal aspects of warfare. The two most heavily represented PLA groups were the National Defense Science and Technology Commission and the military academies. The ranks of both the commission and the academies have increased significantly in the past two years. Although some of the rise represents no more than the filling of slots vacant since the Cultural Revolution, the number of leaders in these two categories identified during national celebrations now dwarfs the other military groups.

The namelist further suggests that the commission has a new head. Liu Hsien-chuan, former Tsinghai leader who has appeared in Peking for the past several years, did not head the commission group. Chang Ai-ping, a veteran Science and Technology Commission official, won this distinction. Liu may have been transferred to Shantung. A poorly heard radiobroadcast listed a person whose name sounded like Liu's as a deputy commander of the Tsinan Military Region in May.

The academy bloc now includes notables such as Hsiao Hua, a former head of the PLA's General Political Department, and Chang I-hsiang, who used to head the Railway Engineering Corps.

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A Line on Chang Chun-chiao

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Chang Chun-chiao is one of the few Chinese leaders with important positions in the party, government, and military bureaucracies. His military duties as chief political commissar responsible for political indoctrination of the troops are fairly clear. His precise party and government responsibilities are less clear, but scattered bits of information allow for some tentative judgments.

Chang has long seemed to be the Politburo member in charge of liaison with foreign communist parties, and he appears to continue these duties. In addition, as a vice premier in the government his responsibilities in foreign affairs appear to have broadened to include the non-communist world as well. He recently hosted the Tunisian prime minister and the President of Gabon.

Last month, accompanied by the minister of culture, Chang met with two cultural delegations, suggesting he may be moving in on Chiang Ching's turf. In addition, he met a press delegation. Taken together, these appearances suggest he has important propaganda responsibilities on behalf of both party and government.

The party and government have separate propaganda vehicles, but all are controlled ultimately by the party. There is some evidence that links Chang with *People's Daily*:

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[redacted]
[redacted] in June, Lu Ying, who worked on the Shanghai newspaper *Liberation Daily* when Chang headed the paper, was identified as "chief leading member" of *People's Daily*, suggesting that Chang's presumed protege is editor-in-chief of the party's official newspaper.

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Given Chang's party position as a member of the Politburo's elite Standing Committee, he appears to be the highest ranking party official with propaganda responsibilities. Yao Wen-yuan also appears to be involved in propaganda work, but he is outranked by Chang and would have to defer to him. Moreover, the government's propaganda outlet, the New China News Agency, would also come under Chang's purview.

Propaganda work would seem to mesh well with Chang's other duties. Since he is charged with setting out the correct party line for the military, it seems logical for him to do the same for the party and government media.

This is not to suggest that Chang's duties are restricted to propaganda work. He still seems, for example, to be the most likely candidate for party secretary general. Propaganda duties, however, would give Chang considerable stature as a party theoretician, a comfortable position to be in when succession time roles around.

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Fertilizer Production Behind Schedule

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China is behind schedule in production of chemical fertilizer. Peking expected output to be 35 million tons in 1975, the last year of the fourth five-year plan, but production will reach only about 80 percent of this goal unless it is increased dramatically during the remainder of the year. Any boost in output would be too late for use on this year's principal crops.

Fertilizer production got off to a good start early in the current plan period. Output--mostly from the rapid expansion of small plants--increased from 18 to 25 percent annually during the early 1970s. This spectacular rate of increase could not be sustained, and only a minimal gain was achieved in 1974. Recent announcements by Peking indicate that the increase this year will fall far short of the additional 10 million tons needed to meet its goal.

China's fertilizer imports have also lagged. Imports last year were reduced by one third because of skyrocketing prices and Peking's shortage of foreign exchange. Purchases were cut back even more during the first half of this year. Peking has recently signed, or is negotiating, new contracts in response to falling fertilizer prices. Much of this fertilizer, however, will be delivered too late for use this crop year.

More high-quality chemical fertilizer will be required to support any substantial increase in agricultural output. The supply situation will not ease, however, until the 13 nitrogen fertilizer plants purchased from the West become fully operational in the late 1970s. Until then, Peking will look to more intensive utilization of organic materials to ease the current shortages of chemical fertilizer.

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Early PRC Container Service Problems

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Peking's first attempt at containerization has pointed out deficiencies in China's internal transport system. The joint Sino-Japanese container service was inaugurated in September 1973 and expanded during the last half of 1974. Vessels in this trade call at Yokohama, Osaka, and Kobe in Japan and at Tientsin and Shanghai in China.

China lacks the specialized equipment and internal transport network needed to use the container service efficiently. The Chinese do not have proper handling equipment so that they must rely on ships' cranes and forklift trucks to move containers in port areas. Cargoes are consolidated at the ports, and often only a fraction of the container's capacity is used because of inexperience in managing containers. Low clearance along China's rail and highway networks further reduces the benefits of containerization.

Improvements in the system and those scheduled for the next five year plan should alleviate the problems. The Chinese are equipping port facilities at Shanghai, Tientsin, and possibly Canton for handling small numbers of containers. The installations at Shanghai and Tientsin--two of China's major ports--will use specialized container-handling equipment, some of it manufactured in Japan and the US. Containership berths may be available at these two ports by the end of this year.


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ANNEX

Mao vs. the Commanders

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Nine of China's eleven regional military commanders have reappeared since Army Day, despite the apparent determination of Chairman Mao to send several of these men into political disgrace. The showdown apparently took place at a meeting in Peking earlier this summer. It seems that the rest of the leadership set Mao's wishes aside in the face of several compelling reasons for taking the pressure off the military commanders.

Not the least of these is the elusive unity that the Chinese have tried to achieve for the past year. The removal of some of the commanders, especially those who sit on the party's ruling politburo, would imply that the leadership remained divided even as Peking was taking firm measures to put a stop to "bourgeois factionalism" in the provinces.

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An article in the current issue of *Red Flag* warns that party committees cannot lead "hundreds of thousands" of people unless the members of the committees are united. This warning applies equally as well to the politburo as to lower level party committees. In addition, the propaganda makes it clear that unity means not only that warring factions must try to work together but that civilians and the military must work out a harmonious relationship.

Moreover, the military is the single most powerful interest group in the party, and it is

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crucial for Peking to maintain good relations with this group. As the recent events in troubled Chekiang Province have shown, the military remains an important instrument for maintaining order. The decision to send troops into Chekiang's factories to restore order and get production moving again was taken only after a series of other measures were unsuccessful.

Chekiang's problems, although more explosive and more persistent than in other areas, are basically not very different from the kinds of factional rivalries that exist in other provinces. It is therefore conceivable that similar disturbances could flare up in other provinces if Peking does not use a firm hand in Chekiang as an example. The cooperation of the military has been essential and could be needed again. Peking would not want to risk alienating the military by purging commanders.

These arguments, which may well have been made on behalf of the commanders during the meeting in Peking this summer, probably cut no ice with Mao. The Chairman seems to have a personal interest in discrediting the commanders, an interest that reflects directly on his prestige.

A case in point is where to put the blame for former Defense Minister Lin Piao's accumulation of power. If the commanders cannot be held responsible, and therefore deserving of punishment, then the lion's share of the guilt rests with the man who named Lin defense minister, and that is Mao. The attacks on the commanders for being supporters of Lin have long served to deflect public attention from Mao's own close association with his now-disgraced former heir. Letting the commanders off the hook on the pro-Lin charge is not at all in Mao's interest.

There probably is an element of vendetta in Mao's apparent hostility toward the commanders.

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These men clamped down hard on Mao's Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Although he may have been persuaded at the time that such moves were necessary, Mao has been blamed for the instability that has grown out of the Cultural Revolution, and each rehabilitation of a Cultural Revolution victim is a further repudiation of the entire movement. At this point,

Mao cannot hope to justify that episode. He could gain a measure of personal satisfaction, however, by seeing some of the commanders removed from office.

Finally, there is the issue of Mao's personal control over the military. As party chairman, Mao is the titular commander in chief of the PLA, but he has apparently argued that he should have real control. A June 7 *People's Daily* article seemed to set out the Chairman's position. The article, using historical analogy, claimed that political and military power must be concentrated in the hands of "the supreme representative of the central political organs." Reinforcing this notion of one-man rule, the article noted that the "supreme representative" was a specific individual. The article concluded that history had vindicated the Legalist approach that soldiers must "obey orders without question," and went on to quote an ancient Legalist who wrote that "soldiers must not have private friends." In the current context, this could have been a complaint by Mao that the military sought allies among other civilians in the leadership in an attempt to escape Mao's wrath.

A response to the *People's Daily* article seems to have been carried in the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* on June 30. The article is not known to have been carried in any national mass circulation publication inside China, suggesting that it touched some very sensitive nerves.

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The delicate point may well be the comparison of the Confucian and Legalist methods for controlling the army that seems to be a clear reversal of the position taken by *People's Daily*.

In the view of *Ta Kung Pao*--which has followed a consistent "Chouist" line--the notion that "the king's wish was law and his words were decrees which must be obeyed without question" was the Confucian, i.e., wrong, view of how to control the military. The correct line was that advocated by the Legalists, who argued that the armed forces should be controlled through the "rule of law." The "rule of law" seems a clear repudiation of the *People's Daily* argument for one-man rule.

The Defense Ministry banquet on the occasion of Army Day provided another indicator of Mao's current status vis-a-vis the military. The NCNA account of the banquet referred to Mao as the founder and commander of the army, but this accolade was not repeated by Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying in his actual remarks at the banquet.

The issue of who is credited with command of the army is, of course, a particularly sensitive one given the history of the Lin Piao affair. Lin was accused of trying to usurp command from Mao. Until his fall in 1971, Lin was cited as directly commanding the PLA while Mao was acknowledged as the founder. In 1972, Mao was referred to as the founder and commander of the PLA in the media and in Yeh Chien-ying's speech at the Defense Ministry banquet. The same formulation was followed in 1973.

In 1974, there was an obvious change that seemed to be in accord with Mao's declining influence over military affairs. By this time, the Chairman had left Peking after his efforts to continue the anti-Confucius campaign against the regional commanders had been rebuffed. Both Yeh's

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toast and the NCNA account referred to Mao only as the great leader of the Chinese people. Thus Mao's treatment in the media on Army Day this year is better than last, but well short of his previous high. This formulation is a tacit admission that the Chairman's apparent effort earlier this summer to establish his personal control of the military and influence the fate of the regional commanders did not succeed.

Taken together, it seems that despite his failing health, Mao is able to assert himself on issues that are important to him. Clearly, the status of the regional military commanders is one such issue. Had it not been for Mao's personal interest in resolving this issue, it is entirely possible that the party would not have called the commanders to Peking this summer. Considerations more important than Mao's personal views enabled the commanders to remain in office. This was a loss for Mao but a victory for unity and stability.

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CHRONOLOGY

Late July- early August	Serious flooding in parts of northeast, north, southwest, and south China dis- rupts transportation and threatens crops. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 3-16	Congressional delegation headed by Senators Percy and Javits visits China, meets with Teng Hsiao-ping and Chiao Kuan-hua. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 6	Delegation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with For- eign Countries led by Yang Chi leaves Sierra Leone for Mauritania. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 7	Ethiopian agricultural study mission arrives in Peking. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 8	Sri Lanka military delegation led by Lt. Gen. Don Sepala Attygalle begins visit to China. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 9	Chinese bank delegation leaves Tanzania for Zambia. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 9-12	Burmese Foreign Minister U Hla Phone in Peking on "friendly" visit, meets with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. [REDACTED]	25X1
August 10	Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets with Ethiopian aviation delega- tion. [REDACTED]	25X1
	Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets with People's United Party delegation from the Seychelles Islands. [REDACTED]	25X1

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August 10 Lanchou Military Region Commander Han Hsien-chu appears in his region for the first time since December 1973. 25X1

August 12-17 North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice Premier and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi hosted in Peking on official visit by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; meets with Chou En-lai on August 16. 25X1

August 14 North Korean "special envoy" and Foreign Minister Ho Tam makes stop-over in Peking on return to Pyongyang from Moscow; greeted by Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung. 25X1

August 15 Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement signed in Tokyo by Chinese Ambassador Chen Chu and Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa. 25X1

Chinese People's Liberation Army veterans delegation departs Peking for Algeria to attend celebration of 20th anniversary of Algeria's veterans day. 25X1

Sino-Japanese agreement to open consulates in Osaka and Shanghai, respectively, signed in Peking by Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Japanese Ambassador Ogawa. 25X1

August 15-19 Cambodian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan in China on official visit; meets with Chou En-lai on August 16; signs "economic and technical cooperation" agreement with China on August 18. 25X1

August 17 Thai trade mission led by Commerce Minister Thouyat Chittawira arrives in Peking. 25X1

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